what philosophers often call “Leibniz’s Law” (not to be confused with this, which sometimes is also call Leibniz’s Law.) The more proper name for it is “the indiscernibility of identicals”. It says,
For any x and y, they are identical (x=y) only if whatever is true of one is true of the other.
This principle seems obviously true, and it seems to be necessarily true – something which is true, and couldn’t conceivably be false. Moreover, all people implicitly recognize it to true.
- Suppose you just met a new friend, Chelsea. She tells you that her dad used to have an important job, that he likes the ladies, loves McDonalds french fries, and speaks with an Arkansas accent. You say to yourself, “I wonder if her dad is Bill Clinton?” Then, you find out that her Dad is four foot nine, and has never been taller. Well, you can be sure that her dad and Clinton are not identical. Why? It follows from what you know (based on her testimony) plus Leibniz’s Law.
- Again, suppose you’re on a jury, trying to decide whether or not the defendent Joe Blow is really the Boston Strangler. If you’re certain that the Boston Strangler has a size 9 shoe, and that Joe Blow is a size 13, then “if the shoe does not fit, you must acquit”. Why? If j and b differ with respect to anything at all (including, of course, shoe size), then it is false that j=b.
OK – the above is mostly common sense, just spelled out with unusual precision. Of course, everything is itself, and not something else. And of course, nothing can differ from itself. So what is the payoff, when it comes to the issue of the Trinity?
Many Christians go around saying things like “Jesus is God“, “Jesus just is God”, or “Jesus is God himself”, etc. And the Father? “He’s God too, of course.” Now, what is being said here? If they’re saying that j=g, and f=g, then it follows (by Leibniz’s Law, or by the transitivity and symmetricality of =) that f=j and that j=f – that Jesus just is the Father, and vice-versa. But if that is so, then “Jesus”, “God”, and “the Father” are three co-referring names – those “three” entities are in fact identical. And thus, whatever is true of one, will be true of the others as well. So we get:
- The Father was born of Mary, and was later crucified.
- Jesus sent his only Son into the world, to redeem humankind.
- There are three persons within the Father.
- Jesus is a Trinity.
Here are some additional reasons I cannot comply to such a two natures approach.
DOCTRINE OF THE TWO NATURES OF CHRIST.
“The Hypothesis of two natures in Christ supposes an infinite nature with all its essential attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, incapable of change or suffering, was indissolubly united in the person of Jesus Christ, with a finite nature, possessing all its properties, as weakness, imperfect knowledge, liability to sorrow, pain, and death, so that the two natures remain forever distinct, each retaining unaltered all its appropriate attributes.”
The Council of Chalcedon, A. D. 451, which claims the merit of having ascertained and settled the doctrine of the incarnation, describes the doctrine of the Two Natures thus: “Jesus Christ is truly God and man, perfect in both natures, consubstantial with the Father with respect to his divinity, and consubstantial with us with respect to his humanity; the two natures, the divine and human, are indissolubly united in him without confusion or change, each retaining all its former attributes, yet so united as to form one person.”
Dr. Barrow on the subject says, “the two natures, the divine and human, were united without any confusion or commixture.—The same person never ceased to be both God and man; not even then, when our Lord as man did undergo death—the union between God and man persisting, when the union between human body and soul was dissolved.”
The Church of England, like the Catholic church, says:
“The Son—took man's nature—so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and manhood were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man.”
Professor Stewart, speaking of Jesus Christ, says, “He must, as it seems to me, be God omniscient and omnipotent, and still a feeble man and of imperfect knowledge.”
Now this doctrine is to be rejected, because, like that of the Trinity, it is essentially incredible. It is not a mystery, but as palpable a contradiction as can be stated. By the nature of any person or being, is always meant his essential qualities. If Christ possess a Divine and Human nature, he must possess the essential qualities of God and the distinctive qualities of man. But these qualities are totally incompatible with one another. The qualities of God are etermity, independence, immutability, exemption from pain, sorrow and death, omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence. But the qualities of MAN are derived existence, dependence, mutability, susceptibility of pain, sorrow and death, comparative weakness and ignorance, and locomotivity. To assert, therefore, that the same mind possesses both a Human and a Divine nature, is to assert that the same mind is both created and uncreated, both finite and infinite, both dependent and independent, both mutable and immutable, both mortal and immortal, both susceptible of pain and unsusceptible of it, both able to do all things and unable, both acquainted with all things and not acquainted with them, both ignorant of some things and possessed of the most intimate knowledge of them, both in all places and only in one place at the same time. Now if this doctrine is not an absurdity, I know not how to conceive of or describe an absurdity. It is a doctrine “which councils and parliaments may decree, but which miracles cannot prove.” It is not pretended that any passage of Scripture expressly asserts the doctrine of the Two Natures. Like that of the Trinity, it is a mere inference from the premises laid down by Trinitarians. I know of no allusion in the Bible to the doctrine of the Two Natures, either with or without modification.
But an objection of a graver character lies against the doctrine of the Two Natures. It implicates the moral character of the Holy Jesus; it impeaches his veracity; and exposes him to the charge of equivocation, duplicity, and falsehood. These are weighty charges; and we cannot endure, for a moment, a hypothesis which throws suspicion of dishonesty upon our blessed Saviour.
Jesus said, “I can of mine own self do nothing.” The Trinitarian says, Jesus can of himself do every thing that God can do. Jesus said, “My Father is greater than I.” The Trinitarian says, Jesus is as great as the Father. To one unacquainted with the use that is made of the doctrine of the Two Natures, these assertions appear to be palpable contradictions. He cannot perceive how the assertions of Jesus, and those of Trinitarians, can both be true. But here comes in the doctrine of the Two Natures to reconcile the apparent contradictions. “Jesus is both God and man,” says the Trinitarian. “And though as man, he can do nothing of himself, yet as God, he can do every thing. Though as man, he is not his Father's equal, yet as God, he is equal with the Father in substance, and power, and glory.” But if he is God, can he say in truth, that he can do nothing of himself ' What, can God do nothing of himself! If he is God, can he say in truth, My Father is greater than I? What, is the Father greater than God! For a man to assert that he eannot do what he is conscious that he can do, is to say what is not true. For what a man can do, in any way, or by any means, he can certainly do. Suppose a man should be required to subscribe his name to a written instrument; and that he should refuse to do it, saying, “I cannot write. I cannot wield the pen. I never learned to write.” Suppose it should be known that this man could write;
that an explanation should be demanded; and that he should say, he only meant that he could not write with his left hand, though he could use the pen with his right hand as well as any man. Would not such a man subject himself to the charge of equivocation, duplicity, and falsehood?
The disciples came to Jesus with these questions: “Tell us, when shall these things be? and what shall be the sign when all these things shall be fulfilled?” After some explanation and caution, Jesus answered thus: “But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the FATHER only.” The Trinitarian says, the Son knew perfectly both the day and the hour. Here the doctrine of the Two Natures is again employed to solve the difficulty. “Jesus being God as well as man,” says the Trinitarian, “he must have known the day and hour as God, though he did not know it as man. When he said he did not know the day and hour, he spoke of his human nature only.” But is this satisfactory? The disciples came to Jesus not to inquire into any distinctions in his nature, but to obtain information of a different kind. Now if Jesus had two natures, the one omniscient, and the other “of imperfect knowledge,” would he not consider the questions addressed to the nature that knew, rather than the nature that did not know, the subject about which the disciples came to inquire? Most certainly. Yet Jesus not only said that the Son did not know, but that the Father only knew. All other persons, besides the Father, whether they be persons in the Trinity or out of it, are excluded from the knowledge of the day and hour.
Let us suppose that a murder is committed in the city of Boston, at noon, by some person or persons unknown— that suspicion fastens upon an innocent man, who, at the time of the murder, was in New York — and that he is charged with the crime, apprehended, and brought to trial. The prisoner summons in his defence a witness, who saw him in New York, about noon, the same day the murder was committed in Boston. This witness, being under oath, is asked, “Did you see the prisoner in New York on that day?” The witness answers, “I did not.” This being the only witness for the defendant, he is convicted, and hanged. After the execution, this witness confesses that he did see the man that was hanged, in New York, on the day and hour specified at the trial. Being required to answer for himself, he says, under oath, that his left eye was defective; only his right eye was sound. And when he testified in court that he did not see the prisoner, he meant that he did not see him with his defective eye; but he saw him distinctly with his sound eye. Now, I ask, would not all honest men consider such a witness perjured? The only difference I can see, between the conduct of such a witness, and that which the doctrine of the Two Natures imputes to Jesus, is, that what Jesus said was not said under the solemnity of an oath. Knowledge is the eye of the mind. Jesus is said to have two capacities of knowledge—his divine and his human nature. The one is strong and piercing, knowing all things. The other is weak and defective, being ignorant of many things. As such an one, he says, in regard to the time of a certain event, he does not know the day nor the hour. He makes no exception of one of his capacities of knowledge; but says, absolutely, he does not know the time. No one knows but the Father. Yet the doctrine of the Two Natures supposes that Jesus did know the day and hour; and that when he said he did not know, he spoke only of his capacity of knowledge which is weak and defective.
Another objection to the doctrine of the Two Natures is, that it renders it impossible to understand or believe any thing that Jesus says of himself. The terms I, me, myself, mine own self, always denote one person, an individual; they include the whole person, all that constitutes him a person. In this sense they were unquestionably used by Christ. When he said, I, me, myself, he could not have meant a part of himself. He could not have meant that part of himself which is infinitely less than another part of himself. If it be admitted that Jesus did not mean himself, his whole self, all that constituted his proper personality, there is no assertion he ever made but what may be contradicted. One has only to say, “This he did as man, it is not true of him as God, therefore it is not true; and this he did as God, it is not true of him as man, therefore it is not true.” In this way, every assertion he ever made of himself, may be contradicted. In this way, we may deny his birth, his crucifixion, his death, and his resurrection, because these were true of him only as man, not as God. If, instead of saying, “My Father is greater than I,” he had said, “I am not so great as my Father, I am not equal with the Father, I am not God, I am not equal with God,” we have only to say, “This he spoke as man, hence it is not true,” in order to set his testimony, concerning himself aside. Now can a doctrine be admitted, which renders his plainest sayings unintelligible, and makes it absolutely impossible for him to deny that he is God, if he had a mind to do so?
That Trinitarians see and condemn this kind of sophistry, when employed about other matters, may be seen by the following quotation. “See Dr. Stillingfleet's Sermon on Matt. 10:16, speaking of the equivocations of Popish Priests, whose common answer, when examined about what they know by confession, is, that they know it not; which they think to vindicate from the charge of lying by saying, that in confession, the Priest knows matters as God, not as man, and therefore he denies to know them, meaning as a man. But, says the Doctor, this is absurd; because to say he does not know, is as much as to say he doth not any way know. Now if this be good against the Papists, as no doubt it is, then sure it is so in the present case. Therefore when Christ says he knows not the day of judgment, it is as much as to say he does not any way know it, and consequently, it is a vain shift to say, it was as man only. We must beware lest we bring the Holy Jesus under such a reproach for equivocation, as the Romish Priests lie under; and make the Jesuits themselves think they have a good title to that name, by imitating herein his example, according to this interpretation.”
The doctrine of the Two Natures throws obscurity over the sacred pages, and renders passages which are sufficiently plain, quite unintelligible. Take, for example, Heb. 1:1,2: “God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds.” Admitting that this passage relates to the creation of the natural world, what does the word Son denote according to the doctrine of the Two Natures? Does it denote the divine, or the human nature? Or does it comprehend both natures? Son cannot mean the divine nature, because God cannot be appointed heir of all things, inasmuch as he is the original proprietor and independent owner of all things. Son cannot mean the human nature, because the worlds were created thousands of years before the human nature existed. Son cannot denote both natures, because that would involve both the difficulties just stated; and render the passage more unintelligible and contradictory than either of the other expositions. Thus, by applying the hypothesis of the Two Natures, this perfectly clear and easy text becomes totally unintelligible.
Take another example: St. Paul says, “we shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ.”—Rom. 14:10. Then Christ must be God omniscient, says the Trinitarian; and, to support his position, reasons thus: “Is it possible for any being, not omniscient, to judge the universe of intelligent creatures? Can he for thousands of years, be present everywhere, and know what is transacted, and penetrate the recesses of the human heart, and remember the whole character and actions of countless myriads, so diverse in talents, temper, circumstances, and situation, and not be omnipresent and omniscient?—Can omniscience be imparted?”. This argument may be abridged, thus: “He, by whom the world is to be judged, must be omniscient. But omniscience cannot be imparted; therefore Christ must be omniscient. And he who is omniscient is God; therefore Christ is God.” Before a man can reason in this manmer, it seems to me, that he must have closed his eyes upon the account which the Scriptures give of the judgment. Whatever men may imagine, St. Paul assures us that “God will judge the world by a MAN (not a God) whom HE hath APPOINTED.” Jesus assures us that the “FATHER hath committed all judgment unto the SON.” St. Peter assures us that “Jesus Christ was ORDAINED of God to be the judge of quick and dead.” God cannot be judge by appointment, or ordination; neither can all judgment be committed to him. “He (Jesus) does indeed act as judge by delegated authority,” says the Trinitarian, “but to act as judge is one thing, to be qualified for the office is another. Exaltation as mediator constitutes him judge, omnipresence and omniscience only can qualify him for that station.” Jesus explains the subject quite differently. He assures us that God qualified him “for that station,” as well as constituted him judge. After speaking of the office of raising the dead and judging the world, by virtue of his commission received from the Father, Jesus says, “the Father hath given him AUTHORITY to execute judgment also, because he is the SON of MAN"—(not because he is God.) And to make his meaning still plainer, immediately after speaking of the resurrection, he adds, “I can of mine own self do nothing: As I HEAR, I judge.” Now if this account of the judgment be admitted as correct—and it must be, I think, unless the testimony of him who is the faithful and true witness can be impeached—what difficulty does the subject involve to require the hypothesis of the Two Natures? If the judge is guided in all his decisions by the Father, who has given him a commandment what he should say and what he should speak; and if he JUDGES only as he HEARS, where is the necessity of omnipresence and ommiscience, to qualify him for that station? Again, if the judge is God omnipresent and omniscicnt, how can he say, “of mine own self I can do nothing: As I hear, I judge.” Can God do nothing without the Father's assistance? Must God hear, before he can judge Once more: The Father hath COMMITTED all judgment unto the SON. To which nature, I would ask the Trinitarian, is the judgment committed? If the Father hath committed all judgment unto the divine nature, then Jesus, As GOD, is dependent on the Father for his commission. This probably, will not be admitted. If the Father hath committed all judgment unto the human nature, then Jesus exercises the highest functions of judge, As MAN only; and the Cmnipresent, omniscient judge, entirely disappears. This, probably, will hardly be admitted. I see no possibility of freeing the subject from these difficulties, but by abandoming the supposition of the Two Natures. Thus the doctrine of the Two Natures creates difficulties where there were none, and then fails to remove them.
We object to the doctrine of the Two Natures, because it would, if admitted, deprive us of the comforts and advantages arising from the example of Christ's prayers and sufferings. In commenting on the secret morning prayer of Jesus, (Mark 1:35) Dr. Adam Clark, in his great zeal for the doctrine of the Two Natures, says—“Not that he needed any thing, for in him dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; but that he might be a pattern to us.” If the learned Doctor be correct, Jesus must have asked his heavenly Father for innumerable blessings which he did not need, that he might be a pattern to us. But how can we imitate such a pattern without praying for such things as we do not need? If Jesus is God, he must have prayed to himself. But of what benefit to us can such an example be? What comfort or instruction can be derived from contemplating the prayers of Jesus, if every prayer he offered was addressed to himself, and he was so independent that he needed nothing? “Being in agony he prayed more earnestly: and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground.” Was all this only to set us an example? What sympathy can we feel with the sufferer, if he needed nothing he prayed for? Prayer is an expression of dependence and want. If a person who needs nothing prays, is it not mere pretence?—is it not hypocrisy?
Finally, the doctrine of the Two Natures defeats its own end. To illustrate this, let us consider it in connection with the doctrine of the atonement as held by Trinitarians. It is argued that sin is an infinite evil; that it deserves an infinite punishment; and, consequently, the atonement must be infinite, But no finite being can make an infinite atonement. But Jesus, being both God and man, is qualified to make an infinite atonement by the sacrifice of himself upon the cross. But all Trinitarians, so far as my knowledge extends, hold that Jesus died as man, not as God. Nothing bled and died but the human nature. The victim, the offering, the sacrifice, was not the divine, but the human nature of Christ, the mere man. This was presented or offered, not to the human, but to the divine nature of Christ, the Supreme God. Thus the infinite atonement entirely disappears. A mere man endures the cross, sheds his blood, and dies an atoning sacrifice to the infinite God. In relation to the doctrine of the atonement, a belief in the proper Deity of Christ has not the least advantage over a belief in his simple humanity.
Trinitarians, in the multiplicity of their inventions, have devised the notion that Jesus Christ, although but a single person, subsists in two distinct natures, the one human and the other divine—the one verily man, and the other truly and essentially God. Hence he is frequently denominated the God-man—a word coined in the mint of Trinitarian theology to express the absolute Godhead and real manhood supposed to be combined in Christ.
This distinction is found to be necessary in supporting the contradictory, yet popular notion of a triune God. If, without making such distinction, it is contended that Jesus Christ is the real, substantial, and self-existent Deity; the monstrous absurdity is involved, that God —the omnipotent Jehovah—actually bled and died upon an ignominious cross! This however is so manifestly absurd and shocking that no rational man can, for a moment, believe it. And to cover this glaring absurdity the Trinitarian contends that Christ possesses two distinct natures, human and divine; and that he suffered and died only in his human nature.
The distinction is found also to be very convenient in explaining certain passages of scripture which plainly show the inferiority of Christ, and which, of course, disprove the position that he is the absolute and sovereign God. Jesus, for instance, declares that “the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do.” “I can,” says he, “of mine own self do nothing. (John V, 19, 30.) These assertions the Trinitarian contends are made in reference to his human nature. In his human nature he can do nothing of himself—nothing unless he is assisted by the supreme God who constitutes his divine nature. The same exposition is given of Christs declaration, “My Father is greater than I.” On this Dr. A. Clark remarks—“It certainly requires very little argument and no sophistry to reconcile this saying with the most orthodox notion of the Godhead of Christ; as he is repeatedly speaking of his divine and his human nature. Of the former, he says, “I and my father are one;” and of the latter, he states with the same truth, “My Father is greater than I.” See Com. on John xiv, 28. This, it must be acknowledged, is a very plausible manner of avoiding the difficulties of the Trinitarian system; but before receiving the doctrine it might be well to examine the soundness of the argument.
The argument is founded on the supposition that the “man Christ Jesus” subsists in two different natures. On this then we remark, that the name, Jesus Christ, and the pronouns used to represent that name, are significant of one person—the one distinct perfect identical person of Jesus Christ. This must be admitted by all, by those who do and those who do not, believe in the Triune solecism. Now if the person, Jesus Christ, is constituted of two distinct natures, the union of both must be essential to the perfection of his person, and both therefore are included in the names applied to signify the person. Or if not, if this union is not essential to the person, if the person is complete and entire in one nature, for instance, in the human nature; then the addition of the divine nature would make the person of Christ more than complete. And if his divine nature is a complete person without his human nature, then there must be two Christs; for each nature—the human and divine, constitutes, separately, a distinct perfect person called Christ, and, in the passages already mentioned, he spake of his human nature, then his divine nature is not Christ.— but if the divine and human nature must be combined in order to make one perfect Christ, then both natures are invariably included in the term. Whenever therefore Jesus speaks of himself, or was spoken of by others, he alludes to his double nature; if indeed he possesses such a double nature. When he says, “I can of mine own self do nothing,” and, “My Father is greater than I,” he makes one affirmative concerning both his divine and human nature; and consequently acknowledges the superiority of his Father. And Trinitarians may turn which way they please. If they say that, in these instances, he speaks solely of his human nature, they deny that the divine nature is essential to the identity of his person—they deny indeed that the divine nature forms any part of Jesus Christ. And if they say his divine and human nature are both
referred to, they must admit that he declares himself inferior to his Father. This double nature will hardly admit of being resolved into mystery. Christ is Christ, whether he subsists in one, two, or an hundred natures; and as many natures as it requires to constitute one Christ, are invariably conveyed by the name applied to him. Christ is Christ indeed whereever he is mentioned in the scriptures. One nature, or one half of him, is not spoken of at one time, and the other half at another time; and each half designated by the name that signifies the whole Christ. But whatever, is affirmed or denied of him is affirmed or denied of the real bona fide identical person, Jesus Christ. R. O. W.
The Hypostatic Union - an Enormous Tax on Human Credulity By William Ellery Channing
[Hypostatic union is a technical term in Christian theology employed in mainstream Christology to describe the union of Christ's humanity and divinity in one hypostasis, or individual existence.]~Wikipedia
See also Difficulties with the Trinity Doctrine by Alvin Lamson 1828
We complain of the doctrine of the Trinity, that, not satisfied with making God three beings, it makes Jesus Christ two beings, and thus introduces infinite confusion into our conceptions of his character. This corruption of Christianity, alike repugnant to common sense and to the general strain of Scripture, is a remarkable proof of the power of a false philosophy in disfiguring the simple truth of Jesus.
According to this doctrine, Jesus Christ, instead of being one mind, one conscious intelligent principle, whom we can understand, consists of two souls, two minds; the one divine, the other human; the one weak, the other almighty; the one ignorant, the other omniscient. Now we maintain that this is to make Christ two beings. To denominate him one person, one being, and yet to suppose him made up of two minds infinitely different from each other, is to abuse and confound language, and to throw darkness over all our conceptions of intelligent natures. According to the common doctrine, each of these two minds in Christ has its own consciousness, its own will, its own perceptions. They have, in fact, no common properties. The divine mind feels none of the wants and sorrows of the human, and the human is infinitely removed from the perfection and happiness of the divine. Can you conceive of two beings in the universe more distinct? We have always thought that one person was constituted and distinguished by one consciousness. The doctrine that one and the same person should have two consciousnesses, two wills, two souls, infinitely different from each other, this we think an enormous tax on human credulity.
We say that if a doctrine, so strange, so difficult, so remote from all the previous conceptions of men, be indeed a part, and an essential part, of revelation, it must be taught with great distinctness, and we ask our brethren to point to some plain, direct passage, where Christ is said to be composed of two minds infinitely different, yet constituting one person. We find none. Other Christians, indeed, tell us that this doctrine is necessary to the harmony of the Scriptures, that some texts ascribe to Jesus Christ human, and others divine properties, and that to reconcile these we must suppose two minds, to which these properties may be referred. In other words, for the purpose of reconciling certain difficult passages, which a just criticism can in a great degree, if not wholly, explain, we must invent an hypothesis vastly more difficult, and involving gross absurdity. We are to find our way out of a labyrinth by a clue which conducts us into mazes infinitely more inextricable.
Surely, if Jesus Christ felt that he consisted of two minds, and that this was a leading feature of his religion, his phraseology respecting himself would have been coloured by this peculiarity. The universal language of men is framed upon the idea that one person is one person, is one mind, and one soul; and when the multitude heard this language from the lips of Jesus, they must have taken it in its usual sense, and must have referred to a single soul all which he spoke, unless expressly instructed to interpret it differently. But where do we find this instruction? Where do you meet, in the New Testament, the phraseology which abounds in Trinitarian books, and which necessarily grows from the doctrine of two natures in Jesus? Where does this divine teacher say, "This I speak as God, and this as man; this is true only of my human mind, this only of my divine?"' Where do we find in the Epistles a trace of this strange phraseology? Nowhere. It was not needed in that day. It was demanded by the errors of a later age.
